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Article 
Jus Cogens: To Revise a Narrative 
Sue S. Guan 
Abstract 
For a decade or so in the mid-twentieth century, 
international policymakers, jurists, and scholars united briefly 
around the concept of a “peremptory,” or jus cogens, norm. Latin 
for “compelling law,” such “supernorms” were deemed non-
derogable by states, and superior to treaty-based and customary 
international law that traditionally constituted international 
law. 
International recognition of the concept of jus cogens was 
formalized in 1969 through Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which voids any treaty that conflicts with 
a jus cogens norm. Since then, however, the concept of jus cogens 
has come under heavy criticism, most commonly for having little 
(if any) practical ability to create legal rights and entitlements 
that bind states and people. Today, the concept of a jus cogens 
norm has faded into near irrelevance. 
This Article explores the cause of the decline, and offers a 
solution: a narrative shift. In particular, I explain that the cost 
of state commitment to jus cogens is simply too high: no state 
will agree to bind itself to an inflexible set of universal principles 
so riddled with uncertainty and contradiction. For example, jus 
cogens is expressed in the vocabulary of the absolute, yet its 
binding nature remains largely contingent on state consent. 
Moreover, its fundamentalist narrative denies any such 
contingency or relevance of the political will of states or 
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international actors—yet leaves open the basic question of what 
norms constitute jus cogens. To that end, this Article offers a 
normative framework focused on shifting the traditional 
fundamentalist narrative towards a more realistic narrative, 
which embraces a context-driven approach that is a familiar 
aspect of traditional treaty negotiation and lowers the cost of 
commitment to jus cogens norms. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself as a member of the United Nations 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) in 1963, involved in the 
drafting of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”). Ten years earlier, in 1953, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, 
the ILC’s Special Rapporteur, had presented to the ILC the 
following proposal: “A treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if 
its performance involves an act which is illegal under 
international law and if it is declared so to be by the 
International Court of Justice.”1 According to Lauterpacht, there 
existed certain peremptory norms, otherwise known as jus 
cogens norms, that reflected “overriding principles of 
international law”2 and: 
[M]ay be regarded as constituting principles of 
international public policy . . . expressive of rules of 
international morality so cogent that an international 
tribunal would consider them as forming part of those 
principles of law generally recognized by civilized nations 
which the International Court of Justice is bound to 
apply . . . .3 
Because you agree that such “overriding principles of 
international law” exist and operate to bind courts in this way, 
you—and the other members of the ILC—undertake to draft the 
following: “A treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm 
of general international law from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm 
of general international law having the same character.”4 
 
 1. Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties: Report by Special Rapporteur, 
[1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63/1953. 
 2. Id. at 90. 
 3. Id. at 155 (citation omitted). 
 4. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of Its 
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Now, you are confronted with various difficult, but sensible, 
questions. How do you define such a “peremptory norm?” What 
are the mechanisms by which a norm attains peremptory status? 
What theoretical or practical criteria must be met? Finally, are 
such norms peremptory because they are inviolably integral to 
the concept of “international morality,” or are they peremptory 
because (all) states have consented? The answers are not so 
clear, and the ILC concludes that “[t]here is not as yet any 
generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule 
of international law as having the character of jus cogens.”5 
Lacking principled criteria by which to identify jus cogens 
norms, you and the ILC decide to punt the determination, 
deferring to future state practice and international 
jurisprudence to fill in the content of and draw the outlines 
around such norms. To quote the ILC, 
[I]nternational law is at a stage of rapid development . . . 
the prudent course seems to be to state in general terms 
the rule that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a rule of 
jus cogens and to leave the full content of this rule to be 
worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of 
international tribunals.6 
Finalized as Article 53 of the VCLT, the provision thus reads: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For 
the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.7 
At this moment, two developments occur simultaneously: (i) the 
concept of jus cogens is formally recognized by an authoritative 
 
Seventeenth Session and on Its Eighteenth Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
169, 247, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. 
 5. Sir Humphrey Waldock (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Law 
of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 36, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 and Add. 
1–3 [hereinafter Second Report on the Law of Treaties]. 
 6. Id. at 53 (citation omitted). 
 7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
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international legal body; and (ii) that authoritative legal body 
abdicates its role in determining the substance of those norms. 
Thus, the concept of jus cogens remains undefined. However, 
by remaining undefined, jus cogens is unable to bind 
international actors. This is because all binding law must issue 
from and with binding authority; merely gesturing in all-or-
nothing vocabulary to jus cogens (as a norm “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole . . . from which no derogation is permitted”8) is 
insufficient. Because it did not determine the source of jus 
cogens’ authority or identify the scope of the norms issuing from 
that authority, the ILC, as a simple practical matter, 
inadvertently but effectively crippled lawmakers’ and jurists’ 
ability to invoke jus cogens in creating and limiting legal 
entitlements. 
This is true for various reasons, which I will explore in this 
Article. In Part II, I begin by pointing out that the concept of jus 
cogens, while not an entirely novel one in the 1950s, did not gain 
widespread traction in international legal discourse until that 
time.9 This period was rife with legal and historical flux. Largely 
due to the atrocities confronted during the recently-concluded 
Second World War, the international legal community found 
itself gravitating towards various affirmations of “fundamental” 
rights—all expressed in the uncompromising vocabulary of the 
universal.10 The concept of jus cogens was no different, 
articulated in absolutist language that was in tension with its 
dependence—for its very content—on state practice and 
undeveloped international jurisprudence. In effect, its 
vocabulary denied its relationship to recent historical events. 
Does this indicate an irreconcilable rift between the 
fundamentalism of substantive jus cogens language and the 
historical specificity of its acceptance by the international 
community? 
In Part III, I point out the unfortunate, somewhat inevitable 
circularity of sourcing such norms among the moving targets of 
international custom and state practice. The concept of total 
non-derogability begins to look incompatible with a custom-
 
 8. Id. art. 53 (citation omitted). 
 9. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus 
Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 334–35 (2009) (tracing the historical 
development of peremptory norms). 
 10. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
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based understanding of the evolution and legitimacy of 
international law. Without static sources of binding law, the 
traditional, state-centric model of international law draws 
nearly all of its authority from state practice, which is constantly 
evolving. And as with such customary norms, the reality is that 
states can and do derogate from peremptory norms—especially 
when jus cogens norms threaten to chip away at states’ (and 
courts’) understanding of sovereignty as inviolable.11 
Part IV discusses the “false universalism” suffered by non-
derogable rights. Because the theory and rhetoric of jus cogens 
leave no room to acknowledge its own contingency, the debate 
around jus cogens threatens to devolve into a hegemonic struggle 
between special interests—all expressed in the language of the 
universal. The inflexibility so crucial to the concept of jus cogens 
makes effecting concrete legal entitlements (especially ones that 
potentially curtail state sovereignty) practically impossible. 
Here, I contrast to traditional treaties, which reflect negotiation, 
compromise, and few absolutes—but actually bind state 
behavior. The cost of committing to jus cogens, however, is 
simply too high: no state will agree to bind itself to an inflexible 
set of universal principles vulnerable to manipulation, open to 
interpretation, and whose basic scope is yet to be determined by 
the practice of other states. Jus cogens cannot be both abstract 
and concrete; the attempt to do so risks the sort of inadvertent 
irrelevance that only the most well-intentioned, abstract ideals 
can achieve. 
Part V offers a few suggestions to recapture the relevance of 
jus cogens norms—by lifting its fundamentalist burden. As a 
start, it may be useful to re-conceptualize jus cogens as 
originating in the rights of people, delinked from statehood or 
jurisdiction. But more importantly, jus cogens’ main obstacle to 
relevance, I argue, is its own absolute inflexibility. That 
narrative can be changed. Stripped of its mandatory, all-or-
nothing vocabulary, jus cogens norms should pose less of a threat 
to state sovereignty and, paradoxically, stand a greater chance 
of effecting concrete behavioral change among international 
actors. For, as with traditional treaties, states could presumably 
more easily bind themselves to uphold jus cogens norms if their 
commitments were context-bound, rather than toothlessly 
 
 11. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and 
Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (1996) [hereinafter 
Bassiouni, International Crimes]; Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity 
in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 419, 431 (1983). 
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atemporal and universal. Characterized in this more modest and 
concrete way, the cost of committing to jus cogens norms is 
drastically lowered—and jus cogens may stand a chance of 
remaining relevant in an international legal landscape that 
shows little sign of moving away from a consent-based model. 
Finally, I conclude by arguing that the ILC’s decades-long, 
not entirely unsuccessful attempt to weave jus cogens norms into 
the fabric of international jurisprudence need not become 
irrelevant. Progress can be achieved by looking to—and 
committing to—a more concrete and more flexible narrative for 
jus cogens norms. Today, there is nothing mandating jus cogens’ 
symbolic absolutism (if there ever was). It is time we remove that 
weight, however laudable it is. 
II. THE HISTORICAL VOCABULARY OF JUS COGENS 
A. IN THEORY, UNIVERSAL 
As understood today, the term “jus cogens” refers to certain 
overriding, peremptory norms that states cannot opt out of, by 
contract or in practice.12 These are norms “at the summit (elite 
norms, as it were) of enhanced normativity—’highest ranking’ 
norms, worth a ‘quality label’,” which rank above the norms 
“below them, the great mass of merely binding norms, which the 
International Law Commission eloquently styles ‘ordinary 
customary or conventional rules.’”13 This idea—that some legal 
principles are inherently normatively superior to others—was 
introduced as early as the seventeenth century.14 However, the 
concept did not gain meaningful jurisprudential traction until 
after World War II (and to a non-negligible degree, as a result of 
that war).15 
In 1945, the newly-ratified United Nations Charter 
(“Charter”) expressed the United Nations’ determination “to 
 
 12. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 331–32. 
 13. Weil, supra note 11, at 424 (quoting Charles De Visscher, Positivisme 
et “Jus Cogens,” 75 REV. GENERALE DE DROIT INT’L PUBLIC 5, 9 (1971)) 
(alteration in original); Paul De Visscher, Cours Général De Droit International 
Public, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 107 (1972); Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Twenty-eighth Session, [1976] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n, pt. 2, 1, 92, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.4/1976/Add.1 (Part 2)) [hereinafter 
Report of the International Law Commission]. 
 14. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 334–35. 
 15. Id. at 336. 
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save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”16 
In doing so, the Charter repeatedly invoked the idea of 
“fundamental freedoms.”17 For instance, the intention was 
expressed to: “[r]eaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women and of nations large and small;”18 “[a]chieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion”;19 and to promote “universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”20 
Complements to the Charter—and specifically, to this language 
in the Charter—UDHR, ICCPR, and other human rights treaties 
emerged shortly after the Charter was ratified. In 1948, for 
example, as a direct “result of the experience of the Second World 
War,” and with the birth of the UN, “the international 
community vowed never again to allow atrocities like those of 
[WWII] happen again.”21 Accordingly, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (“UDHR”) was adopted, which “set[] out, for 
the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally 
protected.”22 In like fashion, in 1966 both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were adopted 
as well.23 Along with various other affirmations of 
“fundamental” rights, these guarantees were intended to 
 
 16. U.N. Charter prmbl. 
 17. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3; art. 55. 
 18. Id. prmbl. 
 19. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 20. Id. art. 55. 
 21. History of the Document: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-
document/index.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2016) [hereinafter History of the 
Document]. 
 22. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (last visited Aug. 
14, 2016). 
 23. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Treaty Doc. 
No.95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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“complement the UN Charter with a road map to guarantee the 
rights of every individual everywhere.”24 
Running parallel to these developments were the first 
meaningful murmurs of peremptory norms among legal 
scholars. On the eve of World War II, Alfred von Verdross posited 
that there had come to exist in international law certain 
compulsory norms, which forbade treaties that “are obviously in 
contradiction to the ethics of a certain community.”25 At the 
time, the issue whether such norms trumped state consent had 
not yet been fully confronted,26 but the post-World War II 
landscape cemented at least some international jurists’ 
conviction that they should. For instance, in its 1951 Advisory 
Opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide 
Convention”), the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
explained that “underlying the [Genocide] Convention are 
principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding 
on States, even without any conventional obligation.”27 In this 
manner, the Court explained, the Genocide Convention was 
“intended by the . . . contracting parties to be definitely 
universal in scope.”28 
The thread running through and uniting these 
developments is the understanding that all states would—and 
should—be bound by peremptory norms. The language used by 
proponents of such norms references the absolute, inflexible, and 
fundamental, and invokes their universality: these norms reflect 
“overriding principles of international law” and “constitut[e] 
principles of international public policy . . . expressive of rules of 
international morality so cogent that an international tribunal 
would consider them forming a part of those principles of law 
generally recognized by civilized nations.”29 If “overriding,” then 
such norms logically are superior to the will of any state who 
would disagree: “[c]lose to the heart of the concept lurks the 
embryonic notion of a world public order not exclusively 
controlled by nation-states, one that is foundational, guarding 
 
 24. History of the Document, supra note 21. 
 25. Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 571, 572 (1937). 
 26. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 335–36. 
 27. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 23 (May 28). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Lauterpacht, supra note 1, at 155. 
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the most fundamental and highly-valued interests of 
international society.”30 Such norms, presumably by definition, 
are “binding on States, even without any conventional 
obligations.”31 This is the most natural interpretation of jus 
cogens norms. 
B. IN PRACTICE, A RETREAT TO STATE CONSENT 
As finalized, the language of Article 53 of the VCLT retreats 
from the original conception of jus cogens as superior to state 
will. Article 53 expresses a conception of peremptory norms as 
explicitly sourced in state consent: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For 
the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.32 
Incorporating state consent introduces several difficult 
logical knots, which jurists have not yet been able to unwind. For 
instance, philosophically speaking, this formulation is a curious 
combination of the natural law tradition that jus cogens norms 
fit most easily within—where such norms are universal simply 
due to their inherent, inviolate moral authority33—and the 
 
 30. Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental 
to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 587 (1988). 
 31. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide, supra note 27. 
 32. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53. 
 33. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 683rd Meeting, [1963] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 60, 63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 (one ILC member argued that 
peremptory norms could be identified on substance alone, for instance, whether 
they were “deeply rooted in the international conscience”); Karen Parker & Lyn 
Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419 (1989). A. Mark Weisburd offers a useful critique of 
the natural law approach to conceptualizing jus cogens: “[S]uch an approach, 
exemplified by Verdross’ reliance on ‘the ethics of a particular community’ as a 
source of jus cogens rules, risks falling into the error of assuming that, if it would 
be a good thing for subjects of a legal system to refrain from particular behavior, 
it must make sense to render the behavior illegal. This does not, however, 
follow. If the behavior is rendered illegal, it will become necessary to determine 
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positivist tradition, in which peremptory norms are binding 
because they reflect state acceptance and consent (as evidenced, 
for instance, in treaties and opinio juris).34 
As a matter of language, there are various tensions created 
by defining a peremptory norm as one “accepted and recognized 
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted,” but simultaneously 
“which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.”35 For instance, if 
to attain peremptory status, a norm must be recognized by the 
“whole” of the international community, does that confer an 
absolute right of veto on any single state dissenter?36 Is it rule 
by numbers, where a majority of states could override any such 
dissenter?37 Can a state that never consented to such a regime 
be held accountable for a perceived derogation? Interestingly, 
the ILC has answered a version of these questions: it has 
explained that recognition by “the international community as a 
whole . . . certainly does not mean the requirement of 
unanimous recognition by all the members of that community, 
which would give each State an inconceivable right of veto.”38 
Instead, the ILC clarified, what is necessary is recognition “not 
only by some particular group of States, even if it constitutes a 
majority, but by all the essential components of the international 
community.”39 But this is still unsatisfactory. Who or what forms 
the “essential components of the international community?” 
The definition of peremptory norms in Article 53 unravels 
further when one considers that such norms “can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having 
the same character.”40 If so, that means peremptory norms can 
be modified only by, essentially, another peremptory norm (one 
having the “same character”). Does that mean all states must in 
 
how to deal with subjects of the legal system who engage in the behavior 
anyway.” A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as 
Illustrated by the War In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 30 (1995) 
(quoting Verdross, supra note 25, at 576). 
 34. See Parker & Neylon, supra note 33, at 422. 
 35. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53. 
 36. For a further exploration of this issue, see Weil, supra note 11, at 426. 
 37. See, e.g., Andreas L. Paulus, Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and 
Fragmentation, 74 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 297, 308 (2005) (discussing the viability 
of persistent objection as a means of avoiding the binding force of jus cogens 
norms). 
 38. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 13, at 119. 
 39. Id. 
 40. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53. 
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unison essentially agree to derogate from the original, non-
derogable norm to create a new, non-derogable norm? That is, 
without universal derogation, no norm could displace a 
peremptory norm, because any deviation would amount to a 
derogation and be invalid.41 
There is essentially no guidance on the process by which a 
conventional norm attains “supernorm” or “superlaw” status—
or what the consequences of attaining such status might be.42 
For instance, how does one reconcile the idea that certain norms 
could “subsequently” take on the nature of a jus cogens norm—
if jus cogens norms were always fundamental and are 
expressions of a priori “overriding principles of international 
law?”43 A peremptory norm would seem by definition atemporal; 
there should be no “subsequent” or “precedent” involved. As 
another example, if certain norms are so fundamental that 
states may be bound without having explicitly consented, then 
the concept of state sovereignty begins to show some cracks. But 
 
 41. This contradiction has created much debate among legal scholars. See 
Weisburd, supra note 33, at 35 (arguing that for jus cogens as formulated under 
Article 53, “there is no higher authority in international law than the consensus 
of states.” This means that “it is a contradiction in terms to refer to jus cogens 
as controlling customary international law. This follows, since to assert that jus 
cogens controls customary international law is to assert that changes in the 
general practice of states cannot affect the legal status of those rules of 
customary international law of jus cogens status. But such a development is 
logically impossible with respect to Article 53 jus cogens, since it would require 
that a rule which ex hypothesi did not represent the general practice of states 
was nonetheless ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of 
states as a whole.’”). 
 42. Weil has more fully explored the differing “tiers” of norms created by 
the concept of jus cogens. See Weil, supra note 11, at 428 (“With normativity 
split into rules on several tiers, it has now become necessary to distinguish, 
within each codifying convention, among the purely conventional rules, the 
ordinary rules of general international law, and the peremptory rules of general 
international law. This raises, inter alia, the problem of derogation through 
particular agreements from the provisions of such conventions and the problem 
of reservations. The recent Convention on the Law of the Sea will certainly give 
rise to difficulties of this kind. One may similarly ask with regard to the 
provisions on jus cogens in Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties: are they purely conventional rules that are binding solely on 
states parties to the Convention? Are they ordinary rules of customary law, so 
that states may derogate from them by particular agreements—which would be 
a denial of the very concept of peremptory norms? Or are they themselves the 
expression of norms of jus cogens, so that no state is entitled to reject the concept 
of peremptory norms?”). 
 43. Lauterpacht, supra note 1 at 154–55. 
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without a robust model of state sovereignty, the consent-based 
foundation of international law starts to look similarly wobbly.44 
Of course, Article 53 does not abandon the concept of state 
consent: a peremptory norm is one that is “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a 
whole . . . .”45 A circularity begins to emerge: how can universal 
acceptance be the metric by which the legitimacy of a jus cogens 
norm is measured so long as those very norms are still in flux?46 
As the ILC admitted, they intended to “leave the full content of 
[jus cogens] to be worked out in State practice and in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals.”47 However, if their 
fundamental nature is taken at face value, peremptory norms 
have never not been peremptory; they are by definition 
immutable. But the circle continues: if immutable, why did their 
widespread recognition take place as late as the mid-twentieth 
century? 
Despite this theoretical confusion, there are some norms 
that are widely considered peremptory: prohibitions against 
grave breaches of humanitarian law (aggression, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, slavery, and torture),48 
prohibitions against the use of force against another state, pacta 
sunt servanda, domaine réservé, a state’s right to enter into 
 
 44. More broadly speaking, in international law, norms are as a general 
matter defined by and given teeth through treaties, state practice, and 
customary law. In other words, to determine the type of event covered by any 
given norm—and the repercussions for violating that norm—one must look 
towards the agreements between states, as well as those states’ practices. See, 
e.g., Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy 
of Norms in International Law, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 583, 583–84 (1997). 
 45. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 53. 
 46. For instance, “the customary prohibition against genocide stemmed 
from the recognition of human rights as a substantive aim of international law 
after World War II.” Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 757, 784–85 (2001). 
 47. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, at 53. 
 48. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 11, at 68. He sources these 
in: “(1) international pronouncements, or what can be called international 
opinio juris, reflecting the recognition that these crimes are deemed part of 
general customary law; (2) language in preambles or other provisions of treaties 
applicable to these crimes which indicates these crimes’ higher status in 
international law; (3) the large number of states which have ratified treaties 
related to these crimes; and (4) the ad hoc international investigations and 
prosecutions of perpetrators of these crimes”; Weisburd, supra note 33; see, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 
(1987); see also Weisburd, supra note 33, at 27–29; (discussing genocide as a 
peremptory norm). 
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treaties.49 As I will discuss later, however, the contradictions 
found in Article 53 are not merely of theoretical consequence—
they remain extremely relevant as states and courts seek to 
parse through disputes created by conflicts over even these 
“accepted” norms with jus cogens status. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF CONTINGENCY 
A. AUTHORSHIP 
As formulated, the concept of jus cogens norms suffers from 
a severe definitional and authoritative vacuum. Jus cogens 
norms exist—and are non-derogable—if states act like they are, 
but states (presumably) will only do so if jus cogens norms a 
priori exist. Nowhere in that formulation does any unitary 
authority play a role in determining what norms qualify, when 
jus cogens status has been attained, or how to translate such 
norms into concrete legal rights and duties. Indeed, as the ILC 
expressly stated, 
[I]nternational law is at a stage of rapid development . . . 
the prudent course seems to be to state in general terms 
the rule that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a rule of 
jus cogens and to leave the full content of this rule to be 
worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of 
international tribunals.50 
States, international courts, and tribunals have effectively 
been saddled with the task of acting as legislatures as well as 
adjudicators for jus cogens norms: “leav[ing] everything to be 
worked out in state practice and by the jurisprudence of 
international tribunals,” “where there is no tribunal having 
jurisdiction,” then “the interested state . . . is made not only the 
judge but also the legislator in its own cause.”51 It can even be 
said that this “amounts to a complete abdication of the 
legislative function.”52 As Lee M. Caplan put it, “allowing the 
courts to determine the parameters of jus cogens through 
 
 49. See Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as 
Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AM J. INT’L L. 946, 965 
(1967). 
 50. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, at 53. 
 51. Schwelb, supra note 49, at 964. 
 52. Id. 
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application of the normative hierarchy theory may undermine 
the principle of separation of powers, in some cases 
inappropriately transferring foreign-policymaking power from 
the political branches of government to the judiciary.”53 
Without a legislature (or with only one ill-equipped to 
legislate), there can be no effective author of law. It is therefore 
entirely unsurprising that states, international courts, and 
international policymakers have struggled for more than a half-
century to flesh out the substance of a jus cogens norm—with 
varying amounts of confusion.54 Without an author, there can be 
at most only a diffusion of authority that, because it is drawn 
from the heterogeneous activity of independent sovereign states, 
creates enormous inconsistency in the task of delineating jus 
cogens norms. 
Nor does the common—but misplaced—attempt to personify 
any such “international community of states” adequately place 
authorship in that entirely vague “community.”55 As seductive 
as attempting to so personify might be, the foundations of 
international law—as I discuss in the next section—are simply 
far too rooted in state consent, and any such “community” 
remains “impossible to identify separately from its members.”56 
For the same reason, there is a deep reluctance to grant any 
international organization or group of states, pluralistic or 
 
 53. Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A 
Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 773 (2003). 
 54. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 9, at 346. 
 55. For a fuller discussion of this “tendency to vague personification,” see 
Weil, supra note 11, at 426. Weil points to the “various telltale signs of a 
tendency to vague personification of the international community. The 
international community ‘accepts and recognizes’ the ascent of an ordinary 
norm to the rank of peremptory norm. It ‘recognizes’ that an international 
obligation is essential to the protection of its ‘fundamental interest,’ which 
seems to imply that the community as such possesses such interests. The 
International Court of Justice considers that a state has obligations to the 
international community and can enter into commitments towards it; one 
Member of the Court has even spoken of rules of law that are the ‘common 
property of the international community.’ Perhaps this community may be 
viewed as identical to the ‘mankind’ whose ‘common heritage’ or ‘province’ is 
nowadays considered to be the use of outer space, the moon, and the seabed 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. However, for want of adequate 
organic representation, this community seems impossible to identify separately 
from its members; but those members—and here the International Law 
Commission has been quite unequivocal—can only be states, to the exclusion 
even of international organizations, which the Commission regards as simply 
‘the creation of those States.’ In brief, the international community means 
states. But all states, or merely some, and, if so, which?” 
 56. Id. 
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otherwise, the authority to determine the substance and scope 
of peremptory norms. Whoever attempts to wield such authority 
purports to bind the entire globe to action or inaction. But 
without such authority, how can the international community 
identify in binding fashion so-called peremptory norms? 
B. AUTHORITY VACUUM 
This confusion is hardly surprising. International law has 
long been plagued by this sort of authority vacuum.57 As H.L.A. 
Hart famously argued, the rules of international law “constitute 
not a system but a simple set.”58 True or not, this statement 
continues to embody the main criticism of international law—
that it comprises laws, customs, and rules binding only because 
states have accepted them as such, rather than laws, customs, 
and rules binding because they are inherently valid or should 
be.59 
Under this formulation, the international legal landscape is 
a pluralistic, decentralized one, built upon the voluntary consent 
of states.60 Those states’ independence and sovereignty thus 
form perhaps the most important aspects of international law. 
As the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCJ”) 
explained, states are the independent subjects of international 
 
 57. Id. at 414 (noting the following weaknesses of the international 
normative system: “not only the inadequacy of its sanction mechanisms, but 
also the mediocrity of many of its norms. In regard to certain points, 
international law knows no norm at all, but a lacuna. As for others, the 
substance of the rule is still too controversial for it effectively to govern the 
conduct of states. On yet other points, the norm has remained at the stage of 
abstract general standards on which only the-necessarily slow-development of 
international law can confer concrete substance and precise meaning.”). 
 58. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 229 (1961). 
 59. See Weil, supra note 11, at 413–418 (describing the structural and 
conceptual weaknesses of the international normative system). 
 60. See Christenson, supra note 30, at 588 (“Despite considerable 
theorizing otherwise, States almost exclusively constitute the present 
international order.”); Salcedo, supra note 44, at 583 (“States are 
simultaneously the creators and subjects of [international law’s] norms; as sole 
authority on the laws they formulate, states themselves assess their meaning 
and scope. It is thus the individual states that interpret the obligations to which 
they—like their partners, the other states—are subject. Finally, it is they who 
decide as to the legality of their own conduct or that of third parties towards 
them. Hence the fragmentary nature of international law, and its relativism, 
the consequence of the equal nature and poorly institutionalized structure of 
international society.”). 
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law, and any law binding them must “emanate from their own 
free will”: 
International law governs relations between 
independent States. The rules of law binding upon States 
therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed 
in conventions or by usages generally accepted as 
expressing principles of law and established in order to 
regulate the relations between these co-existing 
independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the 
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.61 
This conception confirms a few deeply-rooted tenets of 
international law: states are the subjects of and actors under 
international law (as opposed to the citizens that reside in those 
states); states are imbued with sovereignty that is virtually 
inviolable; obligations are legally binding on sovereign states 
only if they agree, and any law purporting to bind states cannot 
do so if it would infringe upon that state’s sovereignty.62 In this 
vein, according to the PCJ, the “first and foremost restriction 
imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the 
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not 
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.”63 
This state-centric model of international law arguably gives 
rise to a corresponding normative deference to a state’s own 
interpretation of its obligations under international law, or more 
specifically, its obligations to carry out the aspects of 
international law that it has expressly consented to (by treaty or 
otherwise).64 An interpretive pluralism—wholly at odds with the 
concept of jus cogens—then arises from the international 
 
 61. S.S.”Lotus,” Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). 
 62. See, e.g., Salcedo, supra note 44, at 583–84 (explaining that 
“international society is essentially a society of sovereign, independent states. 
Despite the great transformations which international organizations have 
brought about in the structure of international society, political power is still 
individually distributed among its members, and international law continues to 
be an eminently decentralized, little institutionalized, legal system. It is for this 
reason that in international law, states are both the legislators and the subjects 
of rules; consent by states is thus logically the keystone in the process of 
creating international legal rules.”). 
 63. S.S.”Lotus,” 1927 P.C.I.J. at 18. 
 64. See, e.g., Salcedo, supra note 44, at 583–84. 
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community’s lack of a hegemonic sovereign to act as a “single 
source of normative validity.”65 
International law, in other words, traditionally operates as 
the law of the contingent—contingent on state consent—
evidenced through practice, formalized agreement, and 
jurisprudential expression. International law’s authority derives 
from the very signs of its existence—in treaty, in state practice, 
in opinio juris. Even more problematically for jus cogens, this 
kind of law is constantly evolving, dependent on the complex 
motivations that drive states in their various roles: as 
legislators, interpreters, adjudicators and enforcers of 
international law. In that model, 
[E]very breach of a customary law contains the seed for 
a new legality. In one sense, the action is a breach 
because the state is judged as a subject of international 
law; in another sense, the action is a seed for a new law 
because the state acts as a legislator of international 
law.66 
Jus cogens norms, on the other hand, seek to affect a shift 
in the standing international legal framework: to bind states 
because such norms are supposedly not contingent; they are 
theoretically accepted by the international community of states 
“as a whole” because their normative validity exists ex ante to 
formalization in treaties or the like. But this proposition is 
extremely difficult to reconcile with the current international 
order, where, even as some principles may attain primacy, they 
do not do so without referencing state consent.67 As Gordon A. 
Christenson has noted, “[w]hile some of these interests might 
become overriding community policies thought fundamental, 
they are still perceived as part of the basic legal order of the 
nation-state system.”68 
There is an unavoidable tension between universalism and 
contingency, between language that binds all, and practice that 
 
 65. Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International 
Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553, 558 (2002). 
 66. Roberts, supra note 46, at 784–85. 
 67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102 n.6 (1987) (noting that jus cogens “is now widely 
accepted . . . as a principle of customary international law (albeit of higher 
status)” and that “[a]lthough the concept of jus cogens is now accepted, its 
content is not agreed”) (emphasis added). 
 68. Christenson, supra note 30, at 588–89. 
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looks to, well, practice. This special kind of tension—the tension 
of an authoritative, normative struggle—finds itself further 
complicated in the jurisprudence of international courts and 
tribunals. 
C. PRIMACY OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
When it comes to adjudicating jus cogens-related rights in 
the context of specific legal disputes, there are no satisfactory 
answers to the questions that logically issue. For instance, who 
suffers injury when a peremptory norm is breached? Does 
universal jurisdiction attach? What about universal standing? 
Are states bound by a universal duty to prosecute? Where do 
states’ obligations logically begin and end? 69 
On the subject of obligations erga omnes, M. Cherif 
Bassiouni has argued that 
[R]ecognizing certain international crimes as jus cogens 
carries with it the duty to prosecute or extradite, the non-
applicability of statutes of limitation for such crimes, and 
universality of jurisdiction over such crimes irrespective 
of where they were committed, by whom (including 
Heads of State), against what category of victims, and 
irrespective of the context of their occurrence (peace or 
war).70 
That is, “characterization of certain crimes as jus cogens places 
upon states the obligatio erga omnes not to grant impunity to the 
violators of such crimes.”71 Unfortunately, it would hardly be 
controversial to state at this point that essentially no such 
obligations have consistently managed to attach among states in 
the international community.72 
 
 69. See Weil, supra note 11, at 430. 
 70. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 11, at 66. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. (“The practice of the states evidences that, more often than not, 
impunity has been allowed for jus cogens crimes, the theory of universality has 
been far from being universally recognized and applied, and the duty to 
prosecute or extradite is more inchoate than established, other than when it 
arises out of specific treaty obligations.”); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for 
Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 9, 10–11 (1996) (noting that despite the extremely high level of 
victimization and hundreds of millions of deaths in the twentieth century, the 
number of prosecutions remains disproportionately low) [hereinafter Bassiouni, 
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Jus cogens norms, broadly speaking, have been incorporated 
in the international legal jurisprudence in very spotty fashion. 
On the one hand, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (“IACHR”) has described jus cogens norms as part of a 
“superior order of legal norms, which the laws of man or nations 
may not contravene,”73 sourced from “the essential dignity of the 
individual.”74 And Judge Lauterpacht, in his separate opinion in 
the case Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and Montenegro), thought that jus cogens norms could 
perhaps be superior to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter 
and Security Council actions.75 On the other hand, the ICJ has 
often chosen instead to rely on the concept of “obligations erga 
omnes.”76 In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ identified 
“obligations erga omnes” as those “obligations of a State towards 
the international community as a whole.”77 These “by their very 
nature [] are the concern of all States”: because of “the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have 
a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes.”78 The Court drew “an essential distinction” between 
 
Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice]. 
 73. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 49 (2003). 
 74. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, at 95–96 (Sept. 
17, 2003). 
 75. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. 408, 
440 (separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.). 
 76. See Paulus, supra note 37, at 307 (collecting cases). 
 77. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd., Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 
33 (Feb. 5). 
 78. Id. The Court went on to note: “[s]uch obligations derive, for example, 
in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, 
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights 
of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial 
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into 
the body of general international law . . . others are conferred by international 
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.” 
  The ILC has interpreted this to meant that “there are in fact a number, 
albeit a small one, of international obligations which, by reason of the 
importance of their subject-matter for the international community as a whole, 
are—unlike the others—obligations in whose fulfillment all States have a legal 
interest”; thus the “responsibility engaged by the breach of these obligations is 
engaged not only in regard to the State which was the direct victim of the 
breach: it is also engaged in regard to all the other members of the international 
community, so that, in the event of a breach of these obligations, every State 
must be considered justified in invoking—probably through judicial channels—
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such obligations “and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the 
field of diplomatic protection.”79 The ICJ has also pointed to 
intransgressible principles as “elementary considerations of 
humanity.”80 
However, even as courts may theoretically endorse the 
concept of jus cogens (or concepts like it, such as obligations erga 
omnes), difficulties arise when courts are faced with the actual 
application of such norms to the rights of parties in resolving a 
concrete dispute. This is especially true because upholding jus 
cogens norms often appears to come at a high price: that of 
chipping away at accepted notions of state sovereignty—which 
courts, not unreasonably, have proven especially reluctant to 
do.81 For instance, in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, it grappled with the 
difficulty in balancing a state’s right to self-defense with the 
individual’s (and the environment’s) right to protection from 
nuclear evisceration.82 In the separate opinion of Judge Dugard 
in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Judge Dugard 
applauded the ICJ’s determination that a reservation to the 
ICJ’s jurisdiction cannot be invalidated solely because it relates 
to a jus cogens norm, such as genocide.83 This is because, notably, 
the Court’s jurisdiction is based on consent, and “no peremptory 
norm requires States to consent to jurisdiction where the 
compliance with a peremptory norm is the issue before the 
Court”—the principle of consent cannot be “overthrow[n].”84 
In this fashion, tenets of jurisdiction and immunity are the 
most common principles courts have relied on in drawing 
conceptual limitations around jus cogens norms. For instance, in 
2001, in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, the European Court of 
 
the responsibility of the State committing the internationally wrongful act.” 
Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 13, at 99. 
 79. Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 33. 
 80. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 112 (June 27). 
 81. See Weisburd, supra note 33, at 26 (“To the extent that enforcing a jus 
cogens rule against a particular state does significant harm to that state, the 
calculus of costs to international society is different from the corresponding 
domestic situation. If a state is weakened by application of a jus cogens rule, the 
consequences may spill over and affect other states.”). 
 82. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226 (July 8). 
 83. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdiction of the Court 
and Admissibility of the Application (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 
2006 I.C.J. 86, 87 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of Dugard, J.). 
 84. Id. at 87, 91. 
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Human Rights (“ECHR”) held that jus cogens violations cannot 
strip sovereign immunity from a state.85 In 2002, the ICJ 
similarly upheld immunity to have been infringed by an arrest 
warrant respecting alleged crimes against humanity.86 A decade 
later, in 2012, the ICJ affirmed the principle of immunity as 
deriving from the sovereign equality of states, one of the 
“fundamental principles of the international legal order,” and 
emphasized the procedural nature of immunity, making it 
“entirely distinct from the substantive law which determines 
whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful.”87 The ICJ 
essentially concluded that “state practice does not support the 
existence of a specific jus cogens exception to the jurisdictional 
immunity of states.”88 
National courts have varied widely in their application of 
jus cogens norms (indeed, in their application of international 
law more broadly), but there is a general skepticism when it 
comes to the propriety of anything invading a domestic 
sovereign’s right to create law governing its territory, even if 
that invasion is one of an international supernorm that the 
sovereign purportedly has by definition consented to.89 In some 
cases, however, international precepts of jus cogens have been 
invoked to delegitimize aspects of domestic law found to be in 
violation of jus cogens norms.90 In Ex parte Pinochet (No. 3), the 
British House of Lords emphasized the limits of immunity with 
respect to gross human rights violations by State officials.91 The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) has explained that “in spite of possible national 
authorisation [sic] by legislative or judicial bodies to violate the 
 
 85. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 19, ¶ 61 (2001). 
 86. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of Congo v. Belg.), 
Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, 30, ¶ 71 (Feb. 14). 
 87. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), 
Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 98, ¶¶ 57–58 (Feb. 3). 
 88. See Ronald J. Bettauer, Germany Sues Italy at the International Court 
of Justice on Foreign Sovereign Immunity – Legal Underpinnings and 
Implications for U.S. Law, AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW (Nov. 19, 2009), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/13/issue/22/germany-sues-italy-
international-court-justice-foreign-sovereign. 
 89. See, e.g., Paulus, supra note 37, at 321. 
 90. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment of 
Judge Mumba, ¶¶ 155–56 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10 
1998). 
 91. Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, 
Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] AC 1 (H.L.) 147 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
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principle banning torture, individuals remain bound to comply 
with that principle.”92 
Ultimately, even as international courts may ideally 
“represent the primacy of abstract humanitarianism over 
diplomatic technique [and] morally oriented retributivism over 
the subtle techniques of public law,”93 this “primacy” has been 
less than completely adhered to in the decisions of these courts. 
If anything, only the “primacy” of state sovereignty has been 
confirmed. As evidenced, there is not a tremendous amount of 
consistency throughout the jurisprudence.94 The one exception 
may be the tendency of courts to reference the signs of state 
consent,95 and consequently to flesh out the normative outlines 
of jus cogens extremely carefully in light of the dominant, state-
centric model of international law. That is, international courts 
and tribunals are generally (and not unreasonably) reluctant to 
impose on states binding and concrete obligations in potential 
curtailment of their sovereignty. 
D. UNIVERSAL AND CONTINGENT   
The absolutist, fundamental vocabulary of jus cogens denies 
its own contingency, its perennial search for authorship, and 
finally, the limitations imposed by a consent-based model of 
international law. But this is a false denial—the complex 
interaction between jus cogens and state consent cannot be 
ignored. As Martti Koskenniemi has put it, “‘[u]niversal values’ 
or ‘the international community’ can only make themselves 
 
 92. Furundzija, IT-95-17 at ¶ 155. 
 93. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 65, at 577. 
 94. See Markus Petsche, Jus Cogens as a Vision of the International Legal 
Order, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 233, 247 (2010) (Petsche divides the 
jurisprudence into three categories: “[t]he first category includes those cases in 
which a court or tribunal refers, often in an obiter dictum, to a specific rule as 
being a jus cogens rule, without any direct effect on the actual outcome. The 
second group of decisions includes those cases in which the alleged jus cogens 
character of a norm is relied upon to seek a result different from a holding of 
invalidity of a treaty. The third category, which is directly relevant for the 
present analysis, comprises the very few cases where the validity of a treaty, or 
a treaty provision, is challenged on the grounds of an alleged jus cogens 
violation.”). 
 95. See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in a Post-Realist Era, 16 
AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1995) (“If we accept treaties and custom as sources of 
the law, this is precisely because they represent, as it were, the external face of 
international social facts. They provide the jurists with a special technique for 
grasping what, in the hard reality of social life, emerges as norms.”). 
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known through mediation by a State, an organization [sic], or a 
political movement.”96 
Even the conception of a more ‘modern,’ hybrid rise to 
legitimacy for norms such as jus cogens cannot untether itself 
from the will of states or other such independent international 
actors. Such a process, some have argued, would be deductive, 
“begin[ing] with general statements of rules rather than 
particular instances of practice,” whereby multilateral treaties 
and declarations by international organs (the United Nations, 
for instance) can more quickly launch widespread recognition of 
declarative customs that are confirmed by state practice.97 But 
again, the legitimizing anchor remains state practice: the 
fictionalized, pluralistic unity of state consent remains the final 
arbiter of the scope of international norms. 
Judge Bedjaoui at the ICJ has endorsed the replacement of 
a “resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international 
law” with “a law more readily seeking to reflect a collective 
juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of 
States organized as a community.”98 However, even that 
“collective juridical conscience” is still comprised of “States 
organized as a community.” A similar problem frustrates the 
sometimes-proffered conception of international law as formed 
around a set of constitutional principles that are hierarchically 
superior to principles merely reflective of the political will of 
states (which are subject to this hierarchy), in analogy to many 
domestic legal systems.99 It is difficult to conceive of such a 
model existing independent of state consent, or at the least, some 
rise among states of a hegemon sitting at the top of the 
(normative) hierarchy. 
Prosper Weil’s position in 1983 still resonates today: 
“international society remains at bottom a society of 
juxtaposition, founded on the ‘sovereign equality of States.’”100 
 
 96. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A 
Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 197, 199 (2004) [hereinafter 
International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration]. 
 97. Roberts, supra note 46, at 758; see also Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, 
The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General 
Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89-90 (1988-89). 
 98. Threat or Use of Force by Nuclear Weapons, Declaration of Mohammed 
Bedjaoui, 1996 I.C.J. 268, ¶ 13 (July 8) (declaration of Mohammed Bedjaoui). 
 99. See, e.g., Stefan Kirchner, Relative Normativity and the Constitutional 
Dimension of International Law: A Place for Values in the International Legal 
System?, 5 GERMAN L.J. 47, 57 (2004). 
 100. Weil, supra note 11, at 419 (quoting Annex to UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV) 
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This creates a “fundamental intellectual confusion” for jus 
cogens norms: they are “derived from rules limiting the freedom 
of subjects of law in legal systems in which the authority to 
determine such rules is undisputed; the subjects of law cannot 
escape the courts’ control; these subjects have in any case 
considerable incentive to submit themselves to the rules applied 
by the courts; and the negative social consequences of compelling 
any single subject of the law to conform to public policy rules will 
almost always be modest. The concept is to be applied, however, 
in an international system in which none of those circumstances 
are present.”101 
The reality is that states, courts and tribunals have 
demonstrated great reluctance to move away from the 
entrenched consent-based model of international law—where 
there is little space for jus cogens norms to take root—to one that 
allows universal norms to operate as binding law and confer 
rights on parties in a legal dispute or otherwise. Nor does it seem 
likely that such reluctance will diminish anytime soon. Thus, as 
discussed in the next part, it may behoove the international 
community to focus instead on addressing a preceding issue: the 
rhetoric of jus cogens. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF RHETORIC 
A. PRIMACY OF INTERPRETATION 
Today, to put it mildly, “[t]he gap between legal expectations 
and legal reality is [] quite wide.”102 Rights only matter if they 
actually effect change in individual entitlements and behavior, 
and there are serious difficulties in matching discrete 
entitlements and remedies to “jus cogens” rights, conceptualized 
as they are in such broad and absolute terms. For, as discussed, 
as currently formulated jus cogens norms suffer from various 
inherent tensions: a definitional vacuum; jurisprudential 
application that veers uneasily between universal sources of 
authority and those rooted in state consent; and a less than ideal 
rhetorical inflexibility that only papers over these tensions 
without resolving any of them. 
 
(1970), reprinted in 65 AJIL 243 (1971), 9 ILM 1292 (1970)). 
 101. Weisburd, supra note 33, at 27. 
 102. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 11, at 66. 
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At the highest levels, jus cogens norms seek to shift the 
paradigm of international rights—especially in relation to 
entrenched notions of state sovereignty.103 The problem is that 
jus cogens, because it seeks to create a kind of superlegal 
supernorm, denies the relevance of authorship and its attendant 
political and rhetorical realities—that is, it denies the “strategic 
choices that are opened by particular vocabularies of global 
governance.”104 For instance, even Bassiouni’s bold, seemingly 
categorical statement, that jus cogens consists of “certain crimes 
[that] affect the interests of the world community as a whole 
because they threaten the peace and security of humankind and 
because they shock the conscience of humanity,”105 is still 
contingent on the existence of an international, state-driven 
agreement as to what “threaten[s] the peace and security of 
humankind,” and what “shock[s] the conscience of humanity.”106 
Thus, even Bassiouni has acknowledged that “jus cogens leaves 
open differences of values, philosophies, goals, and strategies of 
those who claim the existence of the norm in a given situation 
and its applicability to a given legal issue.”107 To quote Oliver 
Gerstenberg, “concepts such as jus cogens are interpretive 
concepts, i.e. concepts that are constitutively part of a global 
transjurisdictionally-led debate about the sources of 
international law—concepts that permit, indeed, invite, deep, 
sharp and pervasive reasonable disagreement among 
interpreters over their meaning and scope.”108 
Definitions and interpretations are excruciatingly 
important, and jus cogens cannot seek to source its authority in 
the disparate will of the states while simultaneously denying 
 
 103. See, e.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Reality of the Law of Nations, in 2 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF SIR HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT26 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1975) (As the origin source remains state 
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a harmony of interests which has a basis more real and tangible than the 
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existing status quo.”). 
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 105. Bassiouni, International Crimes, supra note 11, at 69. 
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that any definitional authority is necessary. For even as the 
narrative around jus cogens is so abstracted that it simply 
ignores (albeit unsuccessfully) its own contingent state of being, 
that denial cannot cancel the need for interpretation. Instead, 
the denial opens up a struggle among international actors to 
declare the content of jus cogens norms. As such, states—still 
operating under the traditional, consent-based model of 
international law—will continue to have little incentive to defer 
to the (as of yet unknowable) fundamental legal principles that 
jus cogens stands for. 
This is not least because the interpretive struggle renders 
the concept of jus cogens vulnerable to manipulation, as the 
contestants in that struggle seek “to make their partial view of 
the meaning appear to be the total view, their preference seem 
like the universal preference.”109 To quote Koskenniemi, “‘human 
rights,’ like any legal vocabulary, is intrinsically open-ended, 
what gets read into it (or out of it) is a matter of subtle 
interpretative strategy.”110 Indeed, “[f]rom its vague 
introduction as some sort of social democracy, the idea of human 
rights had been redeemed only as a concrete Cold War 
position.”111 A rampant kind of normative contest across states 
and legal bodies is risked, where such organs “are engaged in a 
hegemonic struggle in which each hopes to have its special 
interests identified with the general interest,”112 and “[e]ach 
institution speaks its own professional language and seeks to 
translate that into a global Esperanto, to have its special 
interests appear as the natural interests of everybody.”113 As 
Carl Schmitt pithily stated, “[w]hoever invokes humanity wants 
to cheat.”114 
And so proponents of jus cogens espouse their “Esperanto.” 
But the universalism professed by jus cogens advocates may be 
due at least in part to the belief (not necessarily mistaken) that 
 
 109. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition 
and Revival, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113, 119 (2005) (emphasis in original) 
[hereinafter International Law in Europe]. 
 110. Koskenniemi, supra note 104, at 9–10 (“If a British court is able to read 
the indefinite detention of a person in Iraq as a human rights measure, then 
that decision will become part of a shifting pattern of outcomes produced by 
institutions having recourse to human rights vocabularies.”). 
 111. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 79 
(2010). 
 112. Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 65, at 562. 
 113. Id. at 578. 
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such norms must be so radically superior because they threaten 
state sovereignty (a norm that in all likelihood no state will ever 
agree to displace) and the foundational principles of 
international law. After all, in the wake of World War II, the 
prevailing sentiment behind the formalization of jus cogens 
norms in Article 53 was to ensure that no state ever engaged in 
similar atrocities again. But as demonstrated, merely expressing 
that “universal preference” while deferring indefinitely the final, 
authoritative determination of what constitutes a jus cogens 
norm has rendered it meaningless. That is, without 
determinative legal standards, the ILC’s idea of some 
international “Rule of Law” has only unhelpfully deferred the 
decision-making into “further procedure, interpretation, equity, 
context, and so on.”115 
Jus cogens thus suffers from “false universalism,” or the 
universalism of empire: “a universal law, too, has no voice of its 
own . . . all we hear are voices making claims under the law.”116 
In this way, the ostensible fixity of jus cogens risks collapse into 
a “normative myth masking power arrangements that avoid 
substantive meaning until later decision, thereby both 
postponing and inviting political and ideological conflict.”117 
Myths can rarely affect or bind real actors. 
B. TREATIES: SOME CONTEXT 
In a way, all law represents the transposition of certain 
ideals into rules that create and limit rights and entitlements 
among people. With respect to jus cogens norms, states have 
barely even been able to agree on the scope of those ideals—in 
large part because doing so is framed as an all or nothing 
exercise. And, so long as the narrative remains binary, the cost 
of committing to it will be too high: no state will agree to bind 
itself to an inflexible set of universal principles whose scope is 
yet to be determined by the practice of other states. Further, 
even if states were able to agree on a list of norms qualifying for 
peremptory status, that list would still be only a theoretical one 
so long as courts or authoritative international bodies remain 
reluctant to apply that list of norms in a concrete, predictable 
fashion. Because abstract norms cannot on their own create 
 
 115. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L 
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justiciable rights, jus cogens will likely remain doomed to 
languish in well-intentioned irrelevance. 
At this juncture, one possibility deserves a moment of 
consideration. What if jus cogens norms are acknowledged as 
aspirational and context-driven? Perhaps a more useful way of 
conceptualizing jus cogens norms—and lowering their cost of 
commitment—lies in understanding the mandatory, universal 
language through which they are formulated as intentionally 
inconsistent with the fluctuating nature of customary law. 
This statement may seem radical, but it is not. It relates to 
a conception of modern customary law as a hybrid of declaratory 
law and confirmatory practice. More specifically, the idea is 
taken from some commentators’ formulation of treaty law, where 
treaties use “mandatory language to prescribe a model of 
conduct and provide a catalyst for the development of modern 
custom.”118 As an example, Anthea Elizabeth Roberts has noted 
that the various “fundamental” rights enumerated in the UDHR, 
“expressed in mandatory terms,” have managed to attain 
“customary status even though infringements are widespread, 
often gross and generally tolerated by the international 
community.”119 In this way, modern customary law might 
represent “progressive development of the law masked as 
codification by phrasing lex ferenda as lex lata.”120 
Of course, if this conception of international law were 
applied to jus cogens norms, and derogations were openly 
tolerated, carried to its extreme logical conclusion, such a 
narrative could be so flexible that any violation of a jus cogens 
norm might be acceptable. This would be an incoherent result, 
and not one borne out by treaty law. 
Traditional treaties may suffer from some degree of 
normative free-for-all,121 but to a manageable extent. That is 
because in many cases nowadays, “to agree to a treaty is to agree 
on a continued negotiation with [] reference to contextual deal-
striking.”122 Treaties generally involve parties’ ready 
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 119. Id. at 763 (quoting OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 335 (1991)). 
 120. Id. 
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acknowledgement of the negotiating reality and the factual and 
historical context against which that negotiation takes place.123 
This is so even as, for instance, the notion of “peace” may call for 
interpretation,124 and even though much treaty vocabulary 
might be formulated in the language of the aspirational.125 
Ultimately, there are specific historical contexts that give 
rise to the treaty—that is, real events—that (usually) underpin 
the binding rules and concretely-referenced entitlements that a 
treaty’s signatories have formally consented to. This is most 
easily seen in the treaties enacted at the end of international 
conflict, where any given peace settlement has its place in a 
larger, ever-evolving narrative of international history and 
process.126 A fixed narrative of what occurred must be 
established. Negotiations with the very leaders who may have 
perpetrated atrocities must be held.127 Ideological compromises 
must be made. But in the end, binding rules are created (and 
states readily consent to them) because they acknowledge the 
necessary malleability of ideals.128 
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Derogating from ideals is not always prudent, of course. The 
consequences of the realities of negotiating a treaty may be 
“grim,” and justice may be “bartered away for political 
settlements.”129 However, setting aside whether the results are 
the most just or the most normatively superior, the rights and 
entitlements created through such a bartering process, I argue, 
are more real and lasting—if only because states view them as 
such (and here we return to the primacy of state consent)—than 
the virtually non-existent rights and entitlements created by jus 
cogens fundamentalist vocabulary. For example, as Weil has 
noted, some believe “a customary rule prohibiting certain 
nuclear tests has emerged from the 1963 Moscow Treaty,” even 
though he accuses that treaty of suffering from the vagaries of 
international “soft” commitment.130 
By contrast, jus cogens is so weighed down by its claim to 
unanimous acceptance by the “international community of 
states as a whole” that, in effect, it will never bind states, 
because the likelihood that states will agree to a set of universal, 
all-or-nothing rules whose scope is yet inchoate and whose 
enforcement might impinge upon their sovereignty is 
vanishingly small. However, if the burden of absolute obligation 
is lifted, and if the normative aspirations are humbled, treaties 
concerning jus cogens norms could be much less costly for states 
to enter into. Moreover, they could mark a helpful trend toward 
applicable law or the development of relevant custom. State 
sovereignty would not be so threatened, and leaving wiggle room 
for potentially necessary “derogations” (while reality at the 
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moment the treaty is signed catches up to the ideals expressed 
in the treaty), could foster much needed, concrete movement 
toward universal acceptance of jus cogens norms. 
C. NARRATIVE FRAMING 
Treaties, ultimately, engage in a give and take between the 
ideal and reality: they are “a form of governance, a profession, a 
movement . . . turning text into deed, aspiration into 
institution.”131 They further reflect the reality that narratives 
themselves (peace, justice, compensatory rights) must be 
bargained for as well. Finally, their bargained-for flexibility and 
acknowledged need for continuing interpretation provide the 
vehicles for international agreement on the content of binding 
law that perhaps could not otherwise be agreed upon. Thus, 
treaties reveal their signatories’ understanding that there exists 
a “contextually determined equity:”132 they reflect honest 
acknowledgement of the power struggle inherent in the 
negotiating process—not only for present and future 
entitlements to be formalized in the treaty’s text, but also in the 
ongoing interpretive struggle over narrative. 
Even though proponents of jus cogens may not readily 
acknowledge as much, this kind of narrative struggle is easily 
identified in the interpretive choices made when applying 
peremptory norm-based narratives to legal disputes. For 
instance, in the Palestine Wall case, the ICJ had the choice to 
author its decision based on the laws of self-determination, self-
defense against terrorism, and human rights law.133 In another 
example, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) effectively 
overrode the challenges of certain national courts to the ECJ’s 
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jurisdiction and the supremacy of European community law by 
interpreting it as a fundamental rights regime and thereby 
confirming its supremacy over domestic law.134 And, for a more 
hypothetical illustration: 
An agreement between two States . . . to undertake 
collective humanitarian intervention against a third 
State engaged in gross human rights abuse of its own 
citizens could be considered invalid as in conflict with a 
jus cogens norm against forcible intervention in another 
State. It could also be considered, however, as an 
agreement in aid of a peremptory norm against the gross 
abuse of human rights, justifying an exception to the 
general norm against forcible intervention. The political 
outcome would determine to a large extent the legitimacy 
of the claim of invalidity of the original agreement.135 
As these examples show, the normative framework matters, 
and it can certainly influence international power dynamics:136 
“[p]olitical intervention is today often a politics of re-definition, 
that is to say, the strategic definition of a situation or a problem 
by reference to a technical idiom so as to open the door for 
applying the expertise related to that idiom.”137 To borrow a 
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concept from the realist critique of international law, “in law, 
political struggle is waged on what legal words such as 
‘aggression,’ ‘self-determination,’ ‘self-defence,’ ‘terrorist’ or ‘jus 
cogens’ mean, whose policy they will include, and whose they will 
exclude.”138 Indeed, defining “aggression” took nearly twenty 
years for the United Nations, and defining “terrorism” 
stonewalled altogether.139 This especially matters because “the 
problem is clearly less to explain why people who agree are 
bound than why also those should be who do not and how one 
should argue if interpretative controversies arise.”140 
Thus, I argue—and explore more fully in Part V—the 
imperative should be one of transforming the toothless narrative 
surrounding jus cogens into a more powerful one. The current 
narrative, where jus cogens draws its authority from a consent-
based model that is somewhat irreparably at odds with the basic 
concept of jus cogens (universal and non-derogable), will likely 
never translate into legal rights and entitlements that can be 
applied consistently by courts and international legal organs. 
V. LEVERAGING NARRATIVE: AN ALTERNATIVE 
FORMULATION OF JUS COGENS 
A. TOWARDS COMPROMISE 
There is nothing that inherently prevents states from acting 
on behalf of some generalized international interest.141 To quote 
Koskenniemi, “[s]urely our lack of certainty about whether or 
not rape is covered under some definition of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ can be no argument against taking all available 
measures to prevent or punish it.”142 The absolute should not be 
the enemy of the effective. 
And yet, the absolutism of jus cogens guts its effectiveness: 
the current framing of jus cogens as “absolute” creates a binary, 
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all-or-nothing choice for states that understandably makes them 
skittish. For “[w]hatever view the speaker has taken on the 
‘absolutes of international law’ the one thing they seem to agree 
upon is that they are indeed ‘absolutes’ and, as such, call for total 
commitment or total rejection.”143 But this is an unnecessary 
opposition—and one that needlessly ratchets up the cost of 
committing to such norms. For instance, jus cogens, viewed for 
what it arguably is—the “global Esperanto” and “hegemonic 
technique”144 of well-meaning jurists who laudably seek to 
protect the (human) rights of individuals—might be more easily 
committed to by state actors if the obligation were not absolutely 
binary—and if the consequences of commitment were less 
unknown. 
If the rhetoric of jus cogens is shifted to acknowledge its 
necessary contingency and incorporate the realities of 
compromise, I believe that such norms—promoted through more 
modest, incremental and concrete means—can be wielded with 
just as much clout as the ILC could have hoped for, but with a 
lowered cost of commitment and correspondingly higher chance 
of obtaining state consent. Otherwise, if there can be no realistic 
compromise that takes place—as it does, for instance, in treaty 
drafting, reflecting the compromise necessary when authority is 
diffused between sovereign state-authors—then without some 
kind of clear legislative voice, jus cogens norms will never 
achieve easy translation into legal entitlement. Without 
compromise and context, 
[T]heories that hope to ground law on justice, equity, 
social necessity, development trends of history, and so 
forth are always vulnerable to the charges of being 
ideological, unable to demonstrate their correctness in a 
non-circular fashion and framed in such general 
language that it is impossible to draw conclusions from 
them.145 
Again, the binary opposition that jus cogens norms has created 
is a false one, and one that impedes its effectiveness. 
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B. RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE 
It may be worth considering, here, another means of 
lowering the cost of committing to jus cogens norms: the idea of 
re-sourcing the authority for jus cogens norms in human 
individuals. Rather than casting international legal rights as 
those wielded by nation-states, it may be time to cast those 
rights as the rights of the individual subjects of those states—so 
that an affirmation of jus cogens norms is not automatically 
equated with the limitation of a state’s ability to act and 
therefore an encroachment on its sovereignty. 
The outlines of this concept can be found in the very 
invocation of jus cogens by international organizations and 
international courts. The vocabulary surrounding the protection 
of “fundamental” human rights in, for instance, the United 
Nations Charter, refers to those rights as inhering in the 
“human person:” the Charter affirms “the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small,”146 “respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion,”147 and “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”148 
These “fundamental human rights to be universally protected” 
are exactly that: human rights. A parallel can be seen in 
international jurisprudence surrounding peremptory norms: the 
ICJ has referred to “elementary considerations of humanity”149 
and emphasized “the essential dignity of the individual.”150 With 
respect to erga omnes rules, the ICJ has affirmed similar 
universal “obligations of a State to the international community 
as a whole” regarding “the principles and rules concerning the 
basic rights of the human person.”151 
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In other words, a normative shift in jus cogens to conceiving 
of them as the rights of the individual might not so much require 
an overhaul of the international rights regime, as simply a 
reframing of the narrative. Again, this is not as radical as it may 
seem. Some commentators have in fact argued that one of the 
current problems with international human rights law is that 
while human rights were originally conceptualized as rights of 
the individual, their legitimacy and protection rests in the power 
of the states.152 Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent have 
proposed to address this disconnect by embracing a fiduciary 
theory of rights, whereby “peremptory norms arise from a state-
subject fiduciary relationship rather than from state consent,” 
and as such, “the state and its institutions are fiduciaries of the 
people subject to state power, and therefore a state’s claim to 
sovereignty, properly understood, relies on its fulfillment of a 
multifaceted and overarching fiduciary obligation to respect the 
agency and dignity of the people subject to state power.”153 
Such a shift would also approach more closely the public 
order conception of jus cogens, in which peremptory norms 
reflect the global community’s conscience, a conscience dedicated 
to protecting human rights and the like.154 This conception 
would also hew more closely to the original formulation of jus 
cogens, and less closely to the formulation finally adopted as 
Article 53 of the VCLT, which, in the end, depends wholly on 
state consent.155 
Also applicable to this analysis are (arguably) changing 
notions of sovereignty itself. For instance, according to W. 
Michael Reisman, “[i]nternational law still protects sovereignty, 
but—not surprisingly—it is the people’s sovereignty rather than 
the sovereign’s sovereignty.”156 He continues: “[u]nder the old 
concept, even scrutiny of international human rights without the 
permission of the sovereign could arguably constitute a violation 
of sovereignty by its ‘invasion’ of the sovereign’s domaine 
réservé.”157 Such a normative shift suggests that jus cogens 
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norms can in all likelihood be similarly de-linked from the 
“sovereign’s sovereignty.” 
If such a de-linking were to occur, it stands to reason that 
states could more easily bind themselves to uphold jus cogens 
norms in a way that is not automatically reflective of some 
amount of sovereignty being bartered away. This decoupling 
could provide enormous practical benefits to those who are 
protected under jus cogens—that is, everyone. Thus, the ICJ’s 
affirmation in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the 
Genocide Convention of the “common interest” of all states 
begins to take on more meaning: 
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely 
humanitarian and civilizing purpose . . . .In such a 
convention the contracting States do not have any 
interest of their own; they merely have, one and all, a 
common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those 
high purposes which are the raison d’être of the 
Convention.158 
C. AFFIRMATIVE AND CONCRETE 
If the cost of committing to jus cogens norms is thus 
lessened, I believe that states’ reluctance to bind themselves to 
upholding jus cogens norms will decrease as well. Shifting 
authority to individuals helps dispense with the instinct to 
express jus cogens in the binary vocabulary of the absolutely 
non-derogable; the vocabulary of affirmation may be used 
instead. Confirming the intention to protect the rights of its 
subjects would (ideally) operate as an affirmation of a state’s 
sovereignty, rather than subjecting that sovereignty to 
encroachment by an inflexible, absolute commitment to Article 
53 of the VCLT. 
More basically, if the expectations around jus cogens norms 
are lowered, that is, if such norms are more explicitly understood 
as aspirational, I argue states could more easily agree to 
incremental but binding entitlements in pursuit of that ideal. In 
this scenario, reservations or compromises in any given 
convention or agreement respecting jus cogens might simply 
reflect practical constraints, not any fundamental opposition to 
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a given jus cogens norm. Here, even the treaties that reflect the 
“grim” reality of post-conflict compromise between peace and 
justice can be instructive. For, like those treaties, jus cogens-
related agreements can reflect the reality of compromise and 
negotiation. Such agreements might not completely eradicate 
torture, for instance. But they would stand a greater chance of 
creating binding law—even if modest—that forces signatories to 
take concrete measures in pursuit of eradication—already a vast 
improvement over what the current formulation of jus cogens 
can(not) do. 
Stripping jus cogens of its stubbornly fundamentalist, 
mandatory vocabulary, and instead embracing “reflexivity, a 
movement between theory and practice,”159 would, I argue, 
greatly benefit the concept of jus cogens. Not only would doing so 
increase the likelihood of affirmative state action, but this more 
contextualized approach would also allow courts greater freedom 
to incorporate jus cogens norms in their decisions. As it stands, 
potentially overstating their position with respect to and over-
binding themselves to non-negotiable, undeveloped law poses 
such enormous cost to states and courts that they have 
completely abrogated their duty to uphold jus cogens norms. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Jus cogens currently has mere “symbolic significance.”160 
This will remain true so long as jus cogens remains mired in the 
uncompromising vocabulary of the fundamental. However, while 
the road to building jus cogens into the fabric of international 
legal rights and entitlements will no doubt be long and 
complicated, doing so certainly remains possible. For that 
process to materialize, proponents must shift the narrative of jus 
cogens and lower the cost of international commitment; they 
must recognize its contingency and the enduring primacy of the 
state-centric model of international law, engage with its 
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rhetorical limitations, and finally, jettison the weight of its all-
or-nothing fundamentalist rhetoric. 
Advocates of jus cogens norms would do well to remember 
the degree to which the choice of narrative interacts with the 
translation of moral or legal ideals into legal and factual rights 
and entitlements. It is useful to consider a reminder on this point 
from Koskenniemi: 
This play of narratives of unity and fragmentation is 
quite central for the self-understanding of Western law, 
often expressed in the tension between historical 
‘positivity’ and rational ‘system.’ Developments in 
seventeenth century law were told as a story about 
progress from civil war to the united nation as well as 
descent from the Christian community to sovereign 
states. Eighteenth century natural jurisprudence —
Samuel Pufendorf in Germany, Adam Smith in Britain 
—turned the Reformation fear of individualism and 
human self-love into a scientific explanation for 
enlightened absolutism on the one hand, and the wealth 
of nations on the other, while the Kantian postulate of 
the ‘unsocial sociability’ from 1784 remained the last 
refuge for the faith of many a liberal internationalist 
until well into the twentieth century. And today, when 
every unifying deep-structure has been subjected to 
demystifying deconstruction what will be left is 
demystification deconstruction as the great unifying 
myth.161 
The war over jus cogens can be framed as a war over 
narrative: over text and interpretation. And narrative—like 
law—is human-made. Both can be shifted, and in the case of jus 
cogens, both should be. Let us refocus the war, and negotiate an 
end where the casualty will not be the loss of the ideal itself, but 
rather, one where the outcome may reflect compromise, but in 
doing so create binding law. 
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